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Tracking the Moral Truth:





Sharon Street’s 2006 article “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (henceforth Dilemma)​[1]​ challenges the epistemological pretensions of the moral realist, of the nonnaturalist in particular.  Given that “Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” (110), why should one suppose such attitudes and concomitant beliefs would track an independent moral reality?  Especially since, on a nonnaturalist view, moral truth is causally inert.​[2]​  In what follows, I propose to abstract a logical skeleton of Street’s argument and, with its aid, focus on problematic assumptions regarding the (a)causality of moral truth.  






1.	Either there is an evolutionarily-explicable tracking relation (ETR) between the moral truth (MT) and what the nonnaturalist realist believes to be true (NBT), or there is not.

2.	Because evolution is the predominant influence on evaluative beliefs, without an ETR there is no basis for supposing any correlation between MT and NBT.

3.	Supposing an ETR between MT and NBT requires MT to play a causal role.

4.	But (a) every relevant causal role affecting evaluative beliefs has already been appropriated by evolutionary influence, and anyway (b) MT is causally inert and incapable of wielding causal influence.

5.	If 4(a) and 4(b), MT does not and cannot play a causal role.

6.	Therefore, there is no ETR between MT and NBT.






I have somewhat truncated the scope of Street’s discussion to focus on the argument against nonnaturalist realism.  She argues that it applies to naturalist realism as well, but acknowledges that her central focus is on the nonnaturalist:  “non-naturalist versions of value realism lie straightforwardly within my target in this paper” (112).  Here we will be primarily concerned with nonnaturalist realism.

That caveat aside, Step 1 essentially poses Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.  As she puts it, the realist must decide whether or not “natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those [independent evaluative] truths” (109).  I am glossing “favored by natural selection” as evolutionarily-explicable.  In the following, “moral truth” should be understood to be the independent moral truth of the nonnaturalist realist.
	
Street speaks primarily in terms of evaluative attitudes and judgements, while here I will express things in terms of evaluative judgements and beliefs.  This assumes that attitudes can be adequately represented as evaluative beliefs, not pretending thereby to resolve any substantive Humean concerns regarding the respective roles of reason and passion.  I regard “evaluative” as more general than “moral”, but will use those terms indifferently save in contexts where morality and moral truth specifically are at issue.

The implicit assumption is that the nonnaturalist’s evaluative beliefs can constitute moral knowledge only if there is a tracking relation between moral truth and the belief in it.  Apart from a nod to Robert Nozick (125 note 26) and the presumption of some kind of reliability, Street makes no attempt to detail the particular logic of the tracking relation; I shall follow suit. 






Step 2 largely represents the first horn of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.  She argues that without an evolutionarily-explicable tracking relation between moral truths and the beliefs of the nonnaturalist there cannot be any tracking relation:

because it views these evaluative truths as ultimately independent of our evaluative attitudes, the only way for realism both to accept that those attitudes have been deeply influenced by evolutionary causes and to avoid seeing these causes as distorting is for it to claim that these causes actually in some way tracked the alleged independent truths.  (134).

And without the benefit of a tracking relation, any correlation between the two would be a “fluke of luck” (122).  In other words, without such a tracking relation, there can be no knowledge of moral truth.  I gloss “deep influence” as predominant influence.​[4]​  

Regardless, Step 2 may seem a bit squishy:  “predominant” (or “deep”) is not “exclusive” –  room has been left for other influences to enable tracking.  However, she points out that reason or rationality, the most obvious alternative candidate, presumably has itself been shaped by evolution (123-125).​[5]​  Other possible influences – e.g. culture, upbringing, personal idiosyncrasies – may seem no more guaranteed to underwrite a trustworthy (albeit evolution-free) correlation with moral truth.​[6]​








Here we are introduced to the second horn of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, the crux of which follows in Step 4.  The claim is that tracking relations are essentially causal.​[8]​  One might think this pretty much a priori.  Humans are causal organisms; hence any tracking they are involved in will presumably involve causal states or processes of those organisms.  Still, this does not entail that moral truth as such need cause correlative beliefs.​[9]​

Street usually speaks generally in terms of “scientific” compatibility instead of specifically in terms of “causal” significance, yet her commitment to Step 3 is clear in the demand for the explanatory relevance of nonnaturalist truth and in the difficulties she finds with its causal inertness.  As we shall see, particularly in the discussion of Step 4, the requirement of causality lies at the heart of her argument.​[10]​








The soundness of Street’s argument critically depends upon this step.  And indeed, it is plausible to argue that moral truth is not needed to explain the natural selection of evaluative beliefs, and that the intrinsic causal inertness of nonnatural moral truth distinguishes it from natural sources of danger, e.g. predators or fires.​[11]​








The conditional in Step 5 is true, but becomes moot given the falsity of both (a) and (b).  That is, the possibility of a causal role for moral truth has not been ruled out.

STATUS:  Irrelevantly true.


Steps 6 and 7








Let’s take a fresh look at evolution’s involvement in human values.  Putting Street’s concerns aside for the moment, what seem to be plausible ways in which the forces of evolution might have aligned our evaluative beliefs with moral truth?  There are two obvious candidates.  First, for some range of circumstances, the evaluative beliefs that are selectively advantageous may match up with (or overlap) those that are morally true; call this external involvement.  Second, more directly, there might be selective advantage in an inborn ability to determine the truth of moral beliefs; call this internal involvement.  These levels of involvement are clearly distinct:  for example, external involvement is unwitting in a way that internal involvement is not.​[13]​  For the purposes of the former, a purely reflexive commitment to particular evaluative tendencies would suffice; the latter, by contrast, implicates first-personal capabilities of deliberation and judgement (cf. 127-128).  Now the first kind of involvement does naturally incline toward the second.  That is, insofar as it abets evolutionary fitness to believe moral truths, it will also abet fitness to have an ability to determine what is morally true.  Still, we have two different levels at which the forces of evolution might influence human evaluative beliefs in a morally relevant way:  two different opportunities for truth-tracking.  As we shall see, Street challenges the scientific acceptability of both of these possibilities.

But, as we shall also see, she unfortunately doesn’t clearly distinguish between them, frequently seeming to presume they amount to one and the same thing.  They are different, of course.  External involvement – the intersection of selectively advantageous judgements and morally true judgements – raises the question of whether evolution at the level of natural selection tracks moral truth.  Whereas internal involvement questions the capacity or ability of a particular, evolved individual organism to track the moral truth.​[14]​  It is not an especially notable kind of “emergence” for the evolutionary process to gift organisms with characteristics that process does not itself possess.  Natural selection is not sighted, heliotropic nor monogamous (etc.), but that has not prevented organisms from evolving such characteristics.  Evolution, in itself, is simply a fitness-tracking process.​[15]​  But should a chance mutation happen to improve moral truth perception, any circumstantial advantageousness of that perceptivity will augment the fitness of the genome involved.  So even if evolution itself does not track realist moral truth, that would not mean it could not confer such a truth-tracking ability on particular organisms.  Put another way, the conclusion of the following syllogism is a non-sequitor: 

Evolution does not track moral truth,
The moral faculty is a product of evolution,
Therefore, the moral faculty does not track moral truth.​[16]​


So it is one thing to ask whether evolutionary forces are influenced by moral truth, and quite another to ask whether particular (evolved) individuals are capable of grasping that truth.  To appreciate Street’s ambiguity on the topic, consider this passage:

It is actually quite clear, the realist might say, how we should understand the relation between selective pressures and independent evaluative truths. The answer is this:  we may understand these evolutionary causes as having tracked the truth; we may understand the relation in question to be a tracking relation.  The realist might elaborate on this as follows.  Surely, he or she might say, it is advantageous to recognize evaluative truths; surely it promotes one’s survival ….  (125; emphasis added).

The passage begins talking about evolutionary causes tracking the truth, and ends up talking about an individual realist’s recognizing the truth.​[17]​  Now one might contend that these are intimately related, e.g. that reference to “evolutionary causes” is just an abstract way of alluding to abilities of the individual.  However, that may be a bit of a stretch, especially since imposing that clarification undercuts Street’s distinction between tracking and adaptive link accounts (see below).​[18]​  Regardless, external and internal involvement do raise separate questions regarding the relation between evolution and moral truth.  In particular, Street’s concerns with regard to parsimony, expressed in Step 4(a), seem primarily to raise truth-tracking issues at the evolutionary level, whereas concerns in 4(b) with regard to what she calls clarity – the problematic relevance of causally inert moral truth – appear to focus largely on the individual level.  We shall find that the difficulties with her argument derive in no small way from the failure to clarify which level of tracking is at issue.


Step 4(a) and External Involvement 

Step 4(a) claims that “every relevant causal role affecting evaluative beliefs has already been appropriated by evolutionary influence.”  Street explicitly acknowledges external causal involvement:

After all, we think that a lot of our evaluative judgments are true. We also think that the content of many of these same evaluative judgments has been influenced by natural selection. This degree of overlap between the content of evaluative truth and the content of the judgments that natural selection pushed us in the direction of making begs for an explanation.  (125; emphasis added).

Indeed, this point is essentially a restatement of what she regards as the “first premise” of her Darwinian Dilemma:  “the forces of natural selection have had a tremendous influence on the content of human evaluative judgements” (113).​[19]​  It constitutes as well her initial characterization of the realist’s tracking account:  “the evaluative judgments that it proved most selectively advantageous to make are, in general, precisely those evaluative judgments which are true” (126).  However, she soon ups the ante and understands the realist’s account to require, not just an overlap between advantageousness and moral truth, but that the moral truth cause that overlap:  “it is precisely these [independent evaluative] truths that the tracking account invokes to explain why making certain evaluative judgments rather than others conferred advantages in the struggle to survive and reproduce” (129).  Abraham Graber (2012; 593) considers this additional requirement a “dialectical slip” but I would chalk it up instead to awkward exposition.  For Street elsewhere makes clear she believes that what distinguishes the realist view is not the posit of overlap as such but a mistaken view about its genesis:

Both accounts offer an explanation of why it is no coincidence that there is significant overlap between evaluative truths and the kinds of evaluative judgments that natural selection would have pushed us in the direction of.  The difference is that the antirealist account of the overlap is consistent with science.  (154).

She supposes that on the realist’s account moral truth must somehow be invoked to explain why natural selection “pushed us” in its direction.  However, natural selection already accounts for that direction, with no need for any assist; that is, the evaluative beliefs in question were not selected because they represent moral truths but because they were fitness-enhancing.  “Thus, the adaptive link account explains the widespread presence of certain values in the human population more parsimoniously, without any need to posit a role for evaluative truth” (129).

Despite the possibly misleading lead-in, I believe Street has a point.  For mere overlap appears to fall far short of tracking.  Were it caused by and therefore responsive to moral truth, that’s another thing entirely – that might indeed lend credence to the claim that tracking was taking place.  But surely she is correct in believing that this is not the case.  Nonnaturalist moral truth is intrinsically inert:  in itself it cannot “explain why making certain evaluative judgments rather than others conferred advantages in the struggle to survive and reproduce” (129).  While moral truth might “explain” why one evaluative judgement is right rather than another, as such it doesn’t explain anything that happens in the world; in Aristotelian terms, moral truth represents a formal rather than an efficient cause.  It can characterize or identify such happenings in terms of evaluative characteristics, but to do so is not to (efficiently) cause those happenings.  To claim that in certain circumstances moral beliefs possess selective advantage is not unlike saying that in certain circumstances a stopped clock tells the right time (i.e., the two times a day it happens to be right).  Just as we would discount such trivial “time tracking”, it is reasonable that we should also be suspicious of the idea that external involvement as such represents a kind of moral truth-tracking.  


However, some authors – e.g. Enoch (2010), Wielenberg (2010) and Brosnan (2011) – have suggested a “third factor” approach for getting around the intrinsic causal inertness of moral truth.  It doesn’t matter that moral truths themselves are incapable of bringing about correlative beliefs, they argue, if both truths and matching beliefs are brought about by a common third factor.​[20]​  David Enoch dubs this “pre-established harmony” (2010; 413).  There are differences as to how this works out, but they are irrelevant to the general problem with any such account:  viz. the idea that a natural factor can cause a moral truth.  For, just as moral truths are causally inert, mutatis mutandis causal truths are normatively inert.  To see this, let’s look more closely at Brosnan’s version of the story.  In a diagram (2011; 60) he indicates that

	F	The fitness of the belief that “Cooperation is morally good” 

 – his third factor – causes both 

	B	The belief that “Cooperation is morally good”

and its (deflationary) truth:

T	Cooperation is morally good.​[21]​  

(The labels are mine.)  And the fitness of the belief that cooperation is morally good does lead, via natural selection, to the popularity of that belief; that is, F does indeed cause B.





For C to implicate T requires an additional, substantive normative assumption, viz. Brosnan’s fundamental principle:  “what’s morally good has to do with behaviors that promote rather than hinder wellbeing” (2011; 60), i.e. (simplifying)

	FPB	The promotion of wellbeing is morally good.  	

So we need C and FPB to get T.  And, of course, normative claims like FPB are the very nub of the issue.  No one is seriously disputing C, whether cooperation can augment wellbeing.  However, there are disputes regarding the substance of moral truth; as Street notes, there is a “huge universe of logically possible evaluative judgements and truths” (122).  So the crucial factor in bringing about T – “Cooperation is morally good” – is FPB.  But unless we have stumbled upon some new way around Hume’s stricture against deriving ought’s from is’s, natural factors like F are incapable of causing the truth of substantive moral principles like FPB.  Since T depends on FPB, F is consequently incapable of bringing about T.  Every proposed third factor explanation will run up against the same problem:  causal explanations in themselves are normatively inert, and do not and cannot imply anything of moral substance.  Consequently, there is no pre-established harmony:  there is no (efficient) cause of moral truth; therefore, there is no common cause of both moral truths and belief in moral truths; and therefore, there is no third factor causally securing a reliable correlation between the two.  


Nomologically Acquired Causal Powers

Consequently, Street has legitimate grounds for doubting that external involvement – the overlap of selectively advantageous evaluative beliefs with those that are morally correct – reveals a form of truth-tracking.  But it does not follow that the nonnaturalists’ independent evaluative truths have no causal relevance for the process of evolution!  For it can be claimed that in some circumstances doing what is right is selectively advantageous, a claim that ascribes doing what is right the causal power of evolutionary fitness.  To see this requires exposing a common misconception regarding the difference between naturalism and nonnaturalism when it comes to the causal significance of moral value.  Street argues that “Since value naturalists construe evaluative facts as natural facts with causal powers, it is much more comprehensible how grasping such facts could have had an impact on reproductive success” (131).​[22]​  In other words, on a naturalist account it seems clear how moral attributes can have causal effects:  they are logically identified with natural attributes, which have causal powers as such.  But nonnaturalists also suppose a necessary correlation with natural attributes.  It is just that on their account the necessity is synthetic rather than analytic.​[23]​  





where “M” is a moral attribute, “N” a natural attribute, and “↔” represents some kind of law-like relation between the two.​[24]​  For the naturalist, “↔” can be understood as “=df”.​[25]​  For the nonnaturalist, it can be understood as representing a nomological relation, i.e. a nonlogical counterfactual-supporting relation; for example, if it had been M it would have been N, or had it not been M, it wouldn’t have been N.​[26]​  The presumption here is that, as the symbol “↔” suggests, the nomologicality in FP is bidirectional; that is, N is both sufficient and necessary for M.​[27]​  Henceforth, we will interpret “↔” to connote such a nomological relation.​[28]​  Causal claims are paradigmatic examples of nomological relations, yet of course FP for the nonnaturalist is not causal.​[29]​  For the latter, M does not represent some especially subtle natural influence but a characteristic of an utterly different kind, e.g. one imputing action-guiding or reason-giving relevance.  For the nonnaturalist, therefore, FP represents neither a natural nor an analytic truth but a truth that is nomologically necessary.

So on either realist view, whether naturalist or nonnaturalist, there is a necessary connection between moral and natural attributes.  Consequently, it is a misconception to suppose that the nonnaturalist, unlike the naturalist, is precluded from claiming causal powers for moral attributes.  For the nonnaturalist, however, these are not intrinsic powers but extrinsic:  moral attributes, though in themselves causally inert, can acquire causal powers through their nomological relations with natural attributes.  As we shall see, this is a simple consequence of the transitivity of the nomological relation.  Take, for example, a nonnaturalism that posits this fundamental nomological truth:

	FP1	Rightness  ↔  cooperativeness.

In this instance of FP, the moral attribute M = “rightness” and the natural attribute N = “cooperativeness”.  In less affected English one might say “Cooperativeness is (what is) right.”  Exactly what cooperativeness is, is something we need not concern ourselves with, so long as it can be explicated naturalistically.​[30]​  If FP1 seems insufficiently plausible a version of moral realism, readers may substitute whatever natural limning they find preferable.  Presumably, any substantive ethics will have some natural content, otherwise it would be incapable of non-tendentiously identifying instances of right and wrong.

Now, given the (let’s suppose) truth of evolutionary science that

P1	Cooperativeness in certain circumstances is selectively advantageous, 

we can derive, from FP1 and P1,

C1	Rightness in certain circumstances is selectively advantageous.

That is to say, the nomological relation between rightness and cooperativeness postulated by FP1 warrants ascribing the former the causal capabilities of the latter.  Formally,  if A ↔ B and B → C, then A → C.  For:  if it would  be B if and only if it were A and if it were B then it would be C, then if it were A then it would be C.  More generally, nomological relations are transitive.






As the previous sentence shows, nomological relations automatically pass some of the subjunctive tests of relevance, reliability, sensitivity, etc. – counterfactuality is built into the relation.  Nonetheless, it still seems relevant to ask what it would be like were there no overlap between beliefs that are selectively advantageous and beliefs that are morally true.  There are two relevant cases:  first, what is selectively advantageous to believe might be different; and second, what is morally true might be different.​[35]​  In the first case we are supposing that the course of evolution takes a different path.  Street raises this possibility (120):

Imagine, for instance, that we had evolved more along the lines of lions, so that males in relatively frequent circumstances had a strong unreflective evaluative tendency to experience the killing of offspring that were not his own as “demanded” by the circumstances, and so that females, in turn, experienced no strong unreflective tendency to “hold it against” a male when he killed her offspring in such circumstances, on the contrary becoming receptive to his advances soon afterwards.

In this case, I believe the realist has no alternative but to admit that in these circumstances we could have evolved evaluative tendencies very much in variance from the moral truth.​[36]​  But so what?  As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006; 44) points out, the unreliability of evaluative beliefs in impossible “counterfactual worlds” is dubiously relevant to their reliability in the actual world:

if we live in a world with moral facts, and our moral beliefs are actually reliable in this world, then the fact that our moral beliefs would be false in a very different possible world without moral facts need not make our moral beliefs unjustified in this world.

We are fortunate enough in this world to reap the benefits of the overlap of selective advantageousness and moral truth; the problems of possible worlds are not our own.

In the second case, however, we are supposing that the course of evolution continues to bring about e.g. the belief that Rightness ↔ Cooperativeness, but that the moral truth instead (impossibly) is Rightness ↔ N1, where N1 is e.g. lion-ethics or psychopathic cruelty (the “ideally coherent Caligula”).  Street appears to raise this possibility with respect to the “tracking account” she ascribes to the realist (discussed in more detail later on):  “how does the tracking account explain the remarkable coincidence that so many of the truths it posits turn out to be … the very same judgments we would expect to see if our judgments had been selected on those [evolutionary] grounds alone, regardless of their truth?” (132).​[37]​  Were cooperation not right, wouldn’t it still be just as advantageous?  The immediate response, supposing the nonnaturalism of FP1, is that it is not nomologically possible for cooperativeness not to be right.  The impossibility of the antecedents in such claims would appear to render them irrelevant if not incoherent.​[38]​  Justin Clarke-Doane (2012) has suggested that this response is premature, that at least some supposed kinds of impossibility aren’t automatically unintelligible.  But even a tolerance of impossibilities seems of no help.  Supposing that cooperativeness is wrong simply begs the question with respect to FP1 realism; it is no argument against it.  Nevertheless, there does seem to be a plausible sense in which one can claim “had the moral truths been very different, our moral beliefs would have been the same” (Clarke-Doane (2012; 324)).  Since the nomological connection of moral attributes to natural attributes has no relevance for the causal processes of evolution, it does not matter where they connect up or whether they connect up at all – we would still evolve the same evaluative beliefs.  This does show that evolutionary forces do not track moral truth; but, as we shall see, it does not show that individual organisms cannot evolve the ability to track moral truth – so long as there actually is overlap.


The Significance of Nomological Powers

The nomologically acquired causal relevance we have discussed depends on the assumption of normative realism:  given some version of nonnaturalism, we have transparent grounds for ascribing acquired causal powers to moral attributes.  And what holds for moral attributes holds for moral truths.  If Joan’s rightness has acquired causal power then the fact or truth that Joan did what is right has acquired causal power, e.g. in a situation in which her cooperativeness wins the day.  Of course they are not intrinsic powers, but they are legitimately possessed nonetheless.  In other words, while moral truth does not bring about the overlap between what is moral and what is selectively advantageous, on the realist’s view that overlap does lead to moral attributes and truths acquiring causal powers.  If one rules out every instantiation of FP then indeed there is no causal role for moral truth, but that simply begs the question against the nonnaturalist.  On the other hand, if one allows e.g. FP1, then the relevance of evolutionary influences on human evaluative beliefs does not exclude the relevance of moral value but rather embodies it:  as demonstrated by the inference of C1 from P1.  Therefore, while Street may be correct in rejecting external involvement as a kind of moral truth-tracking, it does not follow that on the realist’s view there is no causal relevance to moral value.  Consequently, (a) in Step 4 – that moral truth cannot play a causal role because every relevant causal role regarding evaluative beliefs has already been appropriated by evolutionary influence – is false.

It is important to reëmphasize that these nomologically acquired causal powers are all dependent upon the assumption of something like FP1, viz. a nomological connection between moral and natural attributes.  Such normatively substantive assumptions are permissible in the second horn of Street’s Dilemma – indeed it is precisely to avoid skepticism in that regard that she sees horn two as “the more plausible route for the realist to take” (125).  But they remain completely irrelevant to evolutionary science.​[39]​  The scientist is looking for nomological relations with naturalistic relata; relations with moral properties or attributes are irrelevant to that task.  So in that respect a purely scientific account is indeed more parsimonious:  it can proceed without any assumptions as to the substance of moral truth.  With respect to some normative view of the form “M ↔ N” science is only concerned with the natural attribute N.  That there is a moral attribute M nomologically related to N lies entirely outside its dominion:  it cannot have the least effect on the natural properties or behavior of N.  On the nonnaturalist’s view, the function of moral truth is not to provide a scientific explanation of moral beliefs, but rather a normative justification of them.​[40]​  But being given e.g. FP1 – should the realist be in fact correct – legitimizes a kind of evaluative overlay for characterizations of the causal process:  again, as seen in the inference of C1 from P1.  So this view of the causal significance of moral attributes and facts amounts to a double-edged sword.  First, it is conceded that they are intrinsically causally inefficacious, causally inert:  irrelevant to the scientific account of the genealogy of evaluative beliefs,​[41]​ and indeed deliberately so.  But second, unless the question is begged against realism, some claim like FP1 may be assumed to be true, in which case moral attributes and truths extrinsically acquire causal significance.  In which case what is wrong can hurt you; the significance of this will become clear in the next section.


Step 4(b) and Internal Involvement
 
According to Step 4(b), “moral truth is causally inert and incapable of wielding causal influence.”  In our previous discussion we have already seen that this is technically false.  But we have also seen that the nomologically acquired causal powers posited there do not suffice for the task of moral truth-tracking.  So if we interpret 4(b) as claiming that moral truth is incapable of wielding the kind of causal influence needed for truth-tracking, then the jury’s still out.  Street argues that the causal inertness of nonnaturalist moral truth renders it irrelevant and intangible to evolutionary forces.  She asks, “Exactly why would it promote an organism’s reproductive success to grasp the independent evaluative truths posited by the realist?” (130).  One might naively suppose any truths to be inherently useful, but Street explains there are truths and then there are truths.  On the one hand, there are 

truths about a creature’s manifest surroundings – for example, that there is a fire raging in front of it, or a predator rushing toward it. It is perfectly clear why it tends to promote reproductive success for a creature to grasp such truths:  the fire might burn it to a crisp; the predator might eat it up.  (130).

But, on the other hand, there can be extremely recondite truths, e.g. “about the presence or absence of electromagnetic wavelengths of the lowest frequencies”,  which might be so far from useful as to make their acquisition “positively disadvantageous” (130).

So where on the advantageousness scale fall the moral truths of the nonnaturalist realist:  “In what way then would it have promoted the reproductive success of our ancestors to grasp them?” (130-131).  Street’s assessment:

To say that these truths could kill you or maim you, like a predator or fire, would be one kind of answer, since it makes it clear how recognizing them could be advantageous. But such an answer is clearly not available in the case of the independent irreducibly normative truths posited by the non-naturalist realists.  (131).

Note that it is because moral truth is in itself causally inert that she believes recognizing it is pro tanto causally irrelevant:  she evidently believes the latter follows from the former.  One conspicuous oddity, however, is her analogizing of moral truth with life-endangering things like predators or raging fires.  Is the problem with moral truth that it doesn’t sufficiently threaten to kill or maim?  Given the overlap between selectively advantageous and morally true, surely the problem is with moral untruth or moral ignorance.  It is not obvious whether this is a dialectical slip, or perhaps even a Freudian slip.  But it is worth noting that correcting it pretty much hollows out the plausibility of her argument:

To say that moral untruths could kill you or maim you, like a predator or fire, would be one kind of answer, since it makes it clear how recognizing moral truth could be advantageous.

Would any nonnaturalist realist be reluctant to make this kind of answer?  Consider, for example, the moral untruth “I am so virtuous that beasts and flames cannot harm me.”  Might not this untruth maim or kill its believer?  Nor need we contrive examples:  Street has conceded the overlap between selective advantage and moral truth, at least for some beliefs in some circumstances.  It follows logically that there is a corresponding selective disadvantage to morally ignorant beliefs in those circumstances.​[42]​  

Let us go through this in a little more detail.  It has been noted that the presumption of some realist normative view, for example FP1, legitimizes a kind of evaluative overlay:  the substitution of evaluative attributes for natural attributes without loss of causal relevance.  Again, this is exemplified by the derivation of C1:  “Rightness in certain circumstances is selectively advantageous.”  In addition to things like menacing predators or raging fires in one’s “manifest surroundings”, there are also social circumstances, which is to say, situations involving interactions with others – i.e. in which the nature of one’s cooperativeness can bear consequences for one’s adaptive fitness.  Imagine, for example, a situation in which failure to abide by certain standards of decorum affects one’s ability to strike an advantageous deal.  Or, if that’s not vivid enough, imagine that refusing to bow to the king results in being beheaded.  Refusing to bow in that circumstance is certainly a failure to “cooperate” in some sense; let’s suppose for the sake of argument that this is “cooperation” in the same sense as FP1.  Now apply the evaluative overlay:  is it not now “perfectly clear why it tends to promote reproductive success” to do what is right when led before the king?  Given FP1, or any plausible realist normative view, opportunities for doing wrong in social circumstances are just as much part of one’s manifest surroundings as tigers and wildfires, and potentially no less threatening to one’s reproductive fitness.  Having untrue moral beliefs, and consequently doing what is wrong, can hurt you.  In response to Street’s challenge to the realist:  this is “why it is advantageous to apprehend such truths” (130).


Apprehensively Acquired Causal Powers

Where has her argument gone astray?  Recall that Street seemed to infer the causal insignificance of grasping moral truth (or apprehending, recognizing, perceiving, etc.) from the intrinsic causal inertness of moral truth.  Perhaps it seemed to her:  what possible use are impotent truths?  But I submit she has the logic exactly backwards:  rather, it is because grasping moral truth is not intrinsically causally inert that moral truth acquires causal relevance, viz. as a necessary condition of its being grasped.  Call this apprehensively acquired causal power, in distinction from the nomologically acquired causal power discussed earlier.  If one grants that there may be such a thing as the independent moral truth envisaged by the nonnaturalist and that it may be grasped, then one has granted all that moral truth needs to be able to play an essential role in the world’s goings-on.  These graspings are states or processes (or “mechanisms”) of causal organisms, and the possible impact on evolutionary fitness of an ability to have or make such graspings is no more puzzling than is the impact of the ability to recognize predators or raging fires.

And, in the second horn of her Darwinian Dilemma, Street does indeed grant the possibility of grasping moral truth:  her argument there is not that it can’t happen but that such graspings play no legitimate scientific role.  Many commentaries on Dilemma focus on the issues it raises regarding the possibility of moral knowledge,​[43]​ and indeed that is the focus of horn one.  But her presumption is that moral truth may conceivably be tracked if the realist concedes a relation with evolutionary forces .​[44]​  So horn two takes grasping (a.k.a. perceiving, apprehending, recognizing, discerning, being aware of, etc.) for granted,​[45]​,​[46]​ and instead questions whether there is any place for it in “the game of scientific explanation” (155):

The realist’s other option is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and independent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I argue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds.  (109).

On the contrary, I submit, given the existence of moral truth and the possibility of grasping it, the nonnaturalist has a perfectly straight-forward scientific explanation of why evolution might confer such a capability on humans.  Not to put too fine a point on it:  if morally true evaluative beliefs are selectively advantageous, then the ability to grasp moral truth will also be selectively advantageous.  Street concedes the former; she must also concede the latter.   

Now from context it seems pretty clear that Street takes “grasping” (etc.) to imply “tracking”; after all, she calls the view that posits grasping the “tracking account”.  This makes Dilemma’s second horn a kind of ad absurdum argument against tracking:  assuming humans are able to track moral truth just to demonstrate the scientific inadequacy and irrelevance of that assumption.  But just in case that’s not her intent, in what follows “tracking” may be taken to mean no more than “grasping”, allowing that the latter may fall short of what Street might accept as genuine tracking.  It is enough, on our account, that the existence of moral truth be essential:  viz., you can’t track (grasp) what doesn’t exist.  If moral truth is logically necessary for grasping moral truth and grasping moral truth is causally sufficient for benefiting from its fitness, then moral truth becomes an essential contributor in reaping those benefits.​[47]​  That such a grasping ability might exist for moral truth seems pro tanto no more implausible than the existence of like abilities for logic or mathematics (also involving causally inert truths).​[48]​  Regardless, I will assume, as does Street for the sake of argument, that indeed it can exist.  Insofar as acting in accordance with moral truth is selectively advantageous and insofar as an ability to track moral truth is possible, then of course that ability will be selectively advantageous.  The qualification “all other things being equal” is implicit:  overall fitness imposes trade-offs on different intrinsically desirable traits.  But we need not get down into the weeds to appreciate the Darwinian plausibility of moral truth-tracking abilities in organisms that can benefit from those truths.

Street herself speaks of the “‘mechanism’ of evaluative judgement” wherein

the link between circumstance and response is forged by our taking of one thing to be a reason counting in favor of the other – that is, by the experience of normativity or value.  (128).

But surely there is a difference between mere evaluative judgement – taking one thing as a reason for another (perhaps purely unreflectively) – and recognizing the moral validity of taking one thing as a reason for another.  Yet, while for the sake of argument she grants the nonnaturalist both morally true evaluative judgements and the recognition of moral truths, she seemingly never entertains the possibility of a “mechanism” for the latter.  Why should such a thing not also exist?  Ironically, in a note Street comes ever-so-close to outlining a moral recognition mechanism:

why did we evolve this “normative capacity” as a means of forging links between circumstance and response instead of, for instance, having such links forged solely by brute reflex mechanisms?  The answer presumably has to do with the incredible flexibility and plasticity of the former capacity as opposed to reflex mechanisms ….  (128 note 32).

Now how best to achieve that flexibility?  Suppose that there is significant overlap between morally true evaluative beliefs and selectively advantageous evaluative beliefs, and that persons are capable of perceiving moral truth.  Would not that perceptive ability provide an ideally flexible means of effecting adaptive circumstance-response pairings?  Alas, Street never attains this final aperçu – she is already convinced that neither real moral truth nor its grasp can have any role to play.

But if a “mechanism” for perceiving moral truth is possible, and if genotypes favoring the development of such a mechanism are possible (why not?), and if there is some selective advantage to morally true judgements (given), then ceteris paribus biological beings are likely to develop such mechanisms.  Both nomologically acquired and apprehensively acquired causal powers play a role in facilitating these moral truth-tracking abilities.  The overlap between evaluative beliefs that are fit and evaluative beliefs that are true (external involvement) confers nomological powers on nonnaturalist attributes and truths:  e.g., rightness in some circumstances becomes selectively advantageous (C1 above).  That advantageousness means that in some circumstances an ability to recognize evaluative truths (internal involvement) will also be selectively advantageous.  Natural selection will do the rest.


Tracking and Adaptive Link Compatibility

But this is precisely the view that Street believes she has debunked!  According to her, the tracking account

offers a specific hypothesis as to how the course of natural selection proceeded and what explains the widespread presence of some evaluative judgments rather than others in the human population.  In particular, it says that the presence of these judgments is explained by the fact that these judgments are true, and that the capacity to discern such truths proved advantageous for the purposes of survival and reproduction.  (126; emphasis added).

Why does she not take the possibility of a capacity (or “mechanism”) for discerning moral truth more seriously?  It seems a consequence of failing to distinguish external from internal involvement, i.e. failing to distinguish whether the truth-tracking in question is at the evolutionary level or at the individual level.  For while it is now obvious that in itself the truth of moral judgements has no effect on natural selection, it is hardly obvious that a capacity to discern such truths will be useless in circumstances in which true moral judgements are selectively advantageous. 

We have already seen a possible reason why Street elides the distinction between truth-tracking levels:  namely, the supposition that the capacity to discern moral truth must be causally impotent because moral truth itself is impotent.  I have advanced the opposite:  it is because discerning moral truth is not causally impotent – is in fact a state or process or “mechanism” of a causal being – that moral truth, as a necessary condition of that discernment, acquires causal potency.  Her contrary supposition may explain a failure to recognize that, given a capability for discerning moral truth, the tracking and adaptive link accounts become perfectly compatible.  Here is Street’s description of the difference between the realist’s tracking account and her preferred story:  

    According to what I shall call the adaptive link account, tendencies to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success not because they constituted perceptions of independent evaluative truths, but rather because they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses to those circumstances….  (127; latter emphases added; cf. 114 note 13)

She purports to offer an incompatible explanation – but in fact the two accounts can be seen as complementary parts of the same scientific story.​[49]​  Evaluative judgements can contribute to reproductive success because they are perceived to be true and because that forges adaptive links.  Moral truth is so far from being epiphenomenal, on the realist’s view, that on occasion it is the very perception of moral truth that establishes the linkage between circumstance and behavioral response.  Thus, it is the ability to perceive (grasp) evaluative truth that reconciles the tracking and adaptive link accounts.  The existence of moral truth is a logically necessary condition of the ability to perceive it, while the ability to perceive it can be a causally sufficient condition for the forging of appropriate links between circumstance and response.






The scope of this essay may appear disappointingly narrow.  I have taken advantage of the dialectic in the second horn of Street’s Dilemma to simply assume the existence of realist normative truth and the ability to grasp it.  But for many realists, the crucial significance of her Darwinian Dilemma lies in the horn one concern with the ability to grasp moral truth:  especially the reliability of the purported correlation between the moral truth and what is believed to be morally true.  I agree.  The realist needs to provide a convincing, consensus-inspiring account of the substance of normative truth and the manner in which it can be determined – a consummation devoutly to be wished.  For those who have embraced this challenge, however, the results do not appear uniformly impressive.  Enoch, for example, wishes to build moral realism on the basis of “Survival is good” (2010; 430), Brosnan, as we have seen, defends “Promote wellbeing”, while Behrends suggests “If moral realism is true, then we have reason to pursue our own existence” (2012; 9).​[50]​  It seems to me that these are barely more than pious truisms.  And what is particularly moral about pursuing one’s own survival or wellbeing, or pursuing the means to one’s ends?  Such concerns appear more practical than prosocially normative.​[51]​  The fact that the implicit universal quantification in these principles can be expressed using “we” hardly guarantees that the good involved pertains to the group instead of the individual.  In short, we seem to have little to compare with the normative heft of e.g. Hume, Kant, Rawls or Singer.  It is because the issue of the nature of moral truth is so important in its own right that I scant it here.  It deserves being considered on its own terms, and not just as a way around Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.  I have contented myself here with trying to clear away some of the brush and bracken obscuring the issue, to make it easier to see what is and what is not at stake in grasping moral truth.​[52]​  If this essay has been at all successful, then normative realists, in particular nonnaturalists, can proceed with efforts to illuminate the nature of moral truth without fearing that, even were they to succeed, that accomplishment would fall short of scientific respectability.  For the nonce, that seems scope enough.

Clarke-Doane poses the problem thus:  “the challenge for the moral realist is to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the product of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth” (2012; 313).  The response here has fallen into two parts.  The first part candidly admits a respect in which evolution (or indeed any plausible genealogical process) is undeniably indifferent to moral truth.  Even assuming some realist moral principle a la FP, it’s clear that such a principle plays no role in the course of evolution.  While a natural attribute N may turn out to be selectively advantageous in some circumstances, the fact that it may be nomologically related to moral attribute M does not, and cannot, make any difference to the process of evolution.​[53]​  In this respect moral truth is indeed completely and utterly impotent.  But the second part of our response points out that the selective advantageousness of N in some circumstances (what I have called “external involvement”) implies that the belief in the FP (assuming it is appropriately acted upon) will have selective advantage.  That in turn implies that any capability an organism possesses for determining or grasping the FP’s truth (what has been called “internal involvement”) will also benefit reproductive fitness in those circumstances, as a source of appropriate beliefs.  This finally implies that, all other things being equal, organisms will evolve that capability.  Evolution is not indifferent to the moral truth in this part of the response.  Moral truth does play a role – but as an essential condition, not as a cause.  The moral truth cannot be grasped if there is no moral truth to grasp.  This is not to suppose that the moral truth (efficiently) causes its grasp; it cannot – it is intrinsically inert.​[54]​  Still, given that moral principles are true and that persons are able to grasp them, the moral nonnaturalist realist has a plausible, natural-science-compatible account of how the existence of that ability could arise via intrinsically off-track evolutionary forces.

At the heart of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma is the relation between evolutionary forces and the realist’s independent evaluative truths.  On the one hand, if you picture those truths as essentially separate from the evolutionary process – independent in that sense – then it becomes questionable what possible influence they could have on evolution.  





For the evolutionary process is already sufficient to account for human evaluative judgements; it needs no assistance from moral truth.  Supposing that that truth nonetheless contributes a kind of overdetermination, as Shafer-Landau suggests, only lays bare its unparsimoniousness.  And topping it off, moral truth is intrinsically causally inert, so as such it clearly couldn’t make a difference even had it the opportunity.  

On the other hand, given that it is possible to grasp moral truth, a very different picture becomes available.  
		
Evolutionary forces     →     Grasping moral truth     →     Evaluative beliefs

That is, for the realist, grasping moral truth is an essential part of the process whereby (at least some) evaluative beliefs are bestowed by evolution.  Instead of competing with the evolutionary process, moral truth becomes part of it.  The attitude-independence (stance-independence, mind-independence, etc.) of real moral truth does not entail independence from the evolutionary process, any more than the attitude‑independence of natural truth prevents it from playing an evolutionary role.
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^1	  Page references are to Dilemma unless noted otherwise.
^2	  Graham Oddie (2005) is a notable exception.
^3	  For example:  David Copp (2008),  Street (2008), Skarsaune (2011), Behrends (2012), Graber (2012), Joyce (2013a) and Joyce (2013b).  
^4	  We will not be concerned here with details regarding how that influence is effected.  See Richard Joyce (2013c) for an examination of some of those issues.
^5	  Kevin Brosnan (2011; 56-57) takes her to task on this point.
^6	  Cf. Guy Kahane (2011; 119):  “whatever further causal story needs to be told … – a story that will presumably refer to culture, history or even practical reflection – that further story would do nothing to salvage the epistemic standing of those [evaluative] beliefs.”
^7	  Of course, some philosophers pin their hopes instead on evading evolution’s influence:  e.g. Singer (2005), Kahane (2011), Shafer-Landau (2012), Copp (2008) and Behrends (2012).
^8	  Certainly Brosnan (2011) presupposes that this is the case.  
^9	  Ronald Dworkin (1996), for one, challenges a naturalist, causal account of moral knowledge.  
^10	  Cf. (126 note 29):  “non-naturalist versions of value realism … are ultimately forced … to take a stand on certain matters of scientific explanation….  [T]hese realists are forced … to posit a causal role for evaluative truths in the course of our species’ evolution.”
^11	  Of course, it is implausible that particular, explicit evaluative beliefs have been the target of adaptive selection.  I presume the standard account which supposes that evolution is more directly responsible for evaluative tendencies or dispositions, which can be represented in terms of and/or indirectly give rise to specific, articulable evaluative beliefs.  Cf. Dilemma, 118-121.
^12	  Street actually raises a third objection in addition to those in (a) and (b), but it is arguably a swing-and-miss.  She points out that reference to evaluative truth cannot account for judgements which are not morally true, e.g. giving preferential treatment to members of one’s “in-group” (132-133).  But realists hardly need suppose that evaluative truth can explain the evolution of judgements that are not evaluatively true.
^13	  Some reliabilists would seem to allow grasping the truth to be unwitting, however oxymoronic that may appear.  As best I can tell, Shafer-Landau (2003; Chaps. 11-12) for one seems willing to confer “knowledge” on beliefs individuals may not think warranted and possibly may even think unwarranted, as long as they have acquired those beliefs via a reliable process. 
^14	  Even though these are both kinds of evolutionary involvement, I will in the sequel distinguish between the “evolutionary level” and the “individual level”.  If that seems too confusing, replace the former with “level at which selective forces operate”, or “selective level” for short.
^15	  Cf. Shafer-Landau (2012; 15):  “After all, such [evolutionary] forces will be pushing us to doxastic practices that are adaptive, regardless of whether those practices issue in true beliefs.”  Singer (2005; 342) makes a similar remark:  “The direction of evolution neither follows, nor has any necessary connection with, the path of moral progress.”
^16	  Arguably, this is the reasoning in Joyce (2012a).  Taking “intuition” to be a truth-tracking faculty, the same holds for the “general schema for debunking arguments” in Kahane (2011; 111).
^17	  Street is not the only one guilty of such a conflation.  Compare Clarke-Doane (2012; 319):  “The second claim that falls out of the premise that our moral beliefs are the products of ‘non-truth-tracking’ evolutionary forces is that we were not selected to have true moral beliefs (or selected to have cognitive mechanisms that entail dispositions to form reliable primitive belief-like representations of moral states of affairs).”  Again, from the fact that evolution itself is non-truth-tracking it hardly follows that the cognitive mechanisms individual organisms thereby acquire cannot track moral truth.  In addition to Street and Clarke-Doane, conflation of truth-tracking levels can be found in Joyce (2012a), Kahane (2011), and Shafer-Landau (2012).
^18	  In this respect, it is revealing that Street finds a “deep analogy” between reflexive responses and evaluative judgements (128) – is recognition of moral truth something possibly reflexive?  The functional similarity on which she remarks is relevant only on a level in which the overlap of selective advantage and moral truth is more important than the manner in which it has been achieved.
^19	  Street’s first premise shows up as a presupposition in Step 2 above.
^20	  See Joyce (2012a) for a discussion of this approach.
^21	  I have altered Brosnan’s example to eliminate a reliance on group selection, something both controversial (see Stephen Pinker (2012)) and seemingly unnecessary.  Instead of “causing” Brosnan speaks of “probability raising”, but since that raising of probability is presumably caused, it amounts to the same thing.
^22	  Joyce (2006; Chap. 6) also subscribes to that misconception, as well as Enoch (2010; 422) and Shafer-Landau (2003; 84, 105-106), although the latter effectively undercuts it with the notion of inherited causal powers.
^23	  Cf. Shafer-Landau (2012; 30-31) on the importance of “synthetic a priori” moral knowledge.
^24	  FP is not that different from Joyce’s P2 (2006; 155), though he sees P2 as essentially naturalistic.
^25	  Street calls this a “natural-normative identity” in Dilemma and (2008).
^26	  Kim (1992; 11-12) adds “projectibility” as a test for nomologicality.  But that gets into what counts as evidence for such relations, and I am not concerned to explain how to establish nomological claims like FP.  A worthy topic, but here given a bye.  I only assume some such moral-natural correlations are essential to realist moral views.
^27	  The nomological relation posited here seems quite similar to Kim’s (1992) “nomological coextensivity” and Shafer-Landau’s “necessary coextension” (2003; Chap. 4) .  Naturalists, of course, would prefer a one‑many relation between moral and natural characteristics as a bulwark against reductionism (not so fast, says Kim); but the construal of FP suggested here, albeit one-one, hardly raises the possibility of a nonnatural property being reduced to a natural one.  Such attribute correlations hardly purport attribute identities.
^28	  There are alternative interpretations for the nonnaturalist, and for the naturalist as well. 
^29	  In addition to anything else, causal relations have an asymmetric temporal ordering which nomological relations as such do not.
^30	  Michael Huemer (2005; 218-219) has a nice account of cooperativeness in terms of fairness.
^31	  Compare with Nicholas Sturgeon (1984) and Shafer-Landau (2003).
^32	  Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003; 109):  “it can and often will be true that a given mental event, all by itself, is sufficient to cause whatever physical outcome it does.”  He does qualify this in a footnote – “all by itself … constituted as it is” (his emphasis) – which seems to come down to what the present account considers extrinsic, as opposed to intrinsic, capability.
^33	  There has been much debate over the legitimacy of claims like this, especially in terms of when or whether natural supervenience base properties (e.g. cooperativeness) render moral supervening properties (e.g. rightness) epiphenomenal; see Loeb (2005).  I regard that approach as misdirected, compared with nomologicality, but won’t try to defend that opinion here.
^34	  Karl Schafer’s (2010; 3.1) treatment of the relation between normative and non-normative properties is not unsimilar to my treatment of the relation between natural and moral attributes; his indirect sensitivity seems akin to acquired nomological powers.  
^35	  Of course, both might be different, but that raises no separate issues on its own.
^36	  Indeed, Street regards this as a test of true moral realism (137); she says this specifically of naturalism, but the argument with minor changes would seem to apply equally to nonnaturalism.
^37	  Cf. Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson (1986; 187):  “even if external ethical premises did not exist, we would go on thinking about right and wrong the way that we do.”
^38	  See for example Wielenberg (2010), Shafer-Landau (2012), Sturgeon (1984) and Derek Parfit, (2006).  
^39	  I would argue that Sturgeon (1984; 72-73) conflates the question of whether (given some instance of FP) one can rely upon moral attributes in causal explanations, with the question of whether one need rely upon those attributes.  One can but one needn’t; scientifically they are dispensable and irrelevant.
^40	  Cf. Nagel (1980; 114 note 5):  “The claim that certain reasons exist is a normative claim, not a claim about the best explanation of anything.”  I see this as pretty much the essence of nonnaturalism.
^41	  This more or less splits the difference on the question of whether moral facts are causally efficacious.  See e.g. Harman (1977), Sturgeon (1984), Shafer-Landau (2003), Loeb (2005), Oddie (2005) and Joyce (2006). The answer here:  intrinsically no, extrinsically yes.  
^42	  A la Street (114 note 13), here and elsewhere I avail myself of a kind of internalism-of-convenience by collapsing the distinction between having a belief and acting on it.  I do not presume such a distinction may not otherwise prove useful.
^43	  For example, Shafer-Landau (2012), Enoch (2010), Wielenberg (2010) and Schafer (2010).  
^44	  Unlike Street’s argument in (2007), where it is no longer supposed that cooperation with evolution might shield one from problems of identifying moral truth. 
^45	  It may be thought nonetheless that this sweeps a fundamental mystery under the rug:  viz., the very possibility of a causal being grasping a causally inert truth.  A proper answer would take a book, but the short answer is this.  Consider the ubiquitous computer.  It is a paradigmatically causal entity, yet has no trouble assessing purely formal truths like “5 + 7 = 12”.  If computers can do maths surely humans can do ethics.
^46	  Also unlike the first horn (and unlike Street (2007)), the second horn does not challenge the presumption of standard prosocial morality.
^47	  Erik Wielenberg (2010) makes a deceptively similar argument:  “[Certain cognitive faculties] are responsible for the presence of moral rights in that the presence of the relevant entails the presence of rights.  Thus the connection between the cognitive faculties and moral rights is logical.  The connection between cognitive faculties and beliefs about moral rights is causal.”  However, what he regards as an “entailment” is not a truth of logic but rather a substantive normative claim, viz. Anybody with the requisite cognitive faculties has rights.  I am not trying to establish any such claims; I am rather exploring the consequences of supposing some such claim is true.
^48	  Shafer-Landau (2012; 31) also speaks of “kinds of facts, such as modal, arithmetic and philosophical ones, … that lack causal powers, but are nevertheless knowable”.  Street (2007, note 33) seems willing to throw mathematical truth under the bus along with moral truth, but one wonders whether she would draw the line at logical truth.
^49	  Copp (2008; 195), though he fails to clearly disentangle the evolutionary and individual levels of truth-tracking, also claims compatibility between tracking and adaptive link accounts and argues for the fitness of  a “grasping” ability, viz. a “capacity to detect moral truths”.  Street’s (2008) critique of the latter founders (as above) on the failure to take into account the non-adaptive consequences of moral ignorance.
^50	  Knut Olaf Skarsaune (who idiosyncratically reverses Street’s order and calls her second horn “FIRST HORN” and vice versa) offers “Pleasure is usually good and pain is usually bad” (2011; 232).  The same critique applies.
^51	  It was only after this essay was essentially complete that I read Scott M. James (2009), “The Caveman’s Conscience:  Evolution and Moral Realism”, which has proven a welcome exception to the rule.  As I understand it, James fills in some of the normative blanks by posing as a necessary condition for a realist FP that it be equally acceptable to everyone, where “acceptable” is determined by some rational standard and need not imply “accepted” (i.e., persons can be unreasonable in their demands).  While this is still abstract – we want an account of “acceptability” – it at least entails an essentially prosocial normativity.
^52	  In the words of John Locke, “it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer inclearing ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge” (“Epistle to the Reader”, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding). 
^53	  Interestingly, the naturalist appears to be in the same boat.  The mere fact that M is logically identified with N also has no effect on the causal behavior or capability of N.  This again suggests that differences between naturalism and nonnaturalism have been significantly overestimated; alas, a point that cannot be pursued further here.
^54	  Cf. Don Loeb (2005; 206):  “if there are moral facts, it could be that we believe that they are facts because they are facts, even if they do not cause us to believe in them.”
^55	  Cf. Kitcher (2006; 171):  “we have capacities for fellow-feeling that enable us to assort in … mixed-adult groups, but those capacities are always vulnerable in situations where social defection would bring an evident reward.”  
